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“Myanmar is at a turning point. The newly elected government has expressed its willingness 
to bring peace and development to its people, through a democratic path. As the European 
Union, we have constantly accompanied this path, and we are committed to cooperate even 
more with Myanmar to support the reform efforts of the government: to strengthen 
democracy, good governance, the rule of law, peace, national reconciliation and human 
rights, to tackle poverty and to boost trade and investment.” (European Commission, June 
2016) 
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1. Introduction 
The hesitant democratization in Myanmar since 2011, which stands in contradiction to the 
long-standing repressive rule of the military dictatorship, has attracted attention on a global 
level. Since mid-2000 the military regime in Myanmar has been transformed from one of the 
most repressive regimes of the world to a country in a process of democratization. Over the 
past fifteen years the European Union has attempted to influence the political situation in the 
country- by isolating the military regime from any form of relationship, or by promoting the 
process of democratization after the handover of power to the elected government in 2011. 
(Larkin, 2012: 14)  A lot of experts still doubt on the chances that Myanmar will consolidate, 
and they emphasize the fragility of the new democracy (Pulipaka, 2011; 46). The challenges 
that the young democracy has to face during its consolidation have been created by the 
military rule that lasted 20 years. In order to achieve a consolidated democracy, the country 
has to restructure the former regime - a political system controlled by hegemonic military 
elites (Bünte, 2010:1).  
In the recent years there has been an academic discussion on the mechanisms of 
democratization and the European Union’s contribution to this process. Furthermore it has 
been studied how authoritarian regimes, in this case a military regime, have had an impact on 
the stability of a new young democracy. However, literature has not explained, to what extent 
an external agent, such as the European Union can contribute to prevent an authoritarian 
reversal and tackle the challenges that young democracies with a military legacy have to face.  
This thesis seeks to analyze, how the policies of the European Union have contributed to 
prevent an authoritarian reversal in post-military regimes. 
Therefore the paper aims to answer following research question:  
Does the European Union prevent the risk of an authoritarian reversal in post-military 
regimes? 
In order to answer the research question this thesis will analyze EU-policies towards the 
Myanmar from 2011-2015. 
This project aims to bridge theories on democratization of military regimes with theories on 
how organizations such as the European Union, contribute to the prevention of an 
authoritarian reversal.  
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The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 and 3 will give a theoretical understanding 
of the concept of democratization and the impact of a military ruled-legacy on this process. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4 it will be given a general overview on the EU-policies regarding 
democracy promotion. Chapter 5 will justify the methodology. Chapter 6 will describe the 
case study of Myanmar, its development in the years 2011-2015, its political status-quo and 
its relations with the European Union. The chapter also comprehends the analysis. Finally the 
thesis will conclude by answering the research question and with recommendations.   
2. Definitions 
2.1 Democratization 
Democratization according to the UN “is a process which leads to a more open, more 
participatory, less authoritarian society” (Boutros, 1996 : 1). Democratization describes a 
process of transition from a regime that is not democratic, such as an authoritarian regime, to 
a democracy. It is a complex phenomenon which includes “different spheres of governance 
and social relations” (Lall, 2016: 4). According to scholars like Huntington, the process of 
democratization consists of three steps: the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, the 
transition to a democracy, and finally the consolidation of the democracy (1991: 114). Given 
the rapid increase of democratizations since 1960, different implications on democratization- 
theories have taken place, and many scholars question the key drivers that might influence the 
process. The debates are mostly upon the main factors that initiate, or promote the process 
such as economic development, political culture, civic engagement or external pressure 
(Diamond, 1994; Huntington 1991; et.al). Barbara Geddes claims that the process cannot be 
generalized through one single theory, given the fact that the phenomenon depends on 
circumstances which differ from state to state: Both geographical and historical 
circumstances, as well as the authoritarian legacy influence the process of democratization 
(2011: 611). 
Milan Svolik argues that it is necessary to distinguish between the three stages of the process. 
(2014:715). In order to deconstruct the mechanisms that are involved in democratization, he 
explains two approaches which facilitate the analysis: The substantive and the prospective 
approach. 
The substantive approach evaluates to what extent a democracy is consolidated, by observing 
how much a nation state has approximated a specific set of outcomes that define a democracy 
(Svolik, 2014: 715). On the other hand, the prospective approach associates consolidation with 
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the durability of a democracy. As time plays an important role in the consolidation of 
democracy, the researcher observes the temporal aspect of the democratization (Svolik, 2014: 
715). 
2.2 Democracy 
Democracy in this thesis is understood as following: elections in which representatives and 
policies can be selected trough political participation, press freedom, the freedom of assembly 
and expression (Huntington, 1991: 9; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1989:  xvi). Other key 
elements of a consolidated democracy are the rule of law, the equality of citizens (including 
minorities and marginalized populations), and the equal access to political participation 
(O’Donnell, 1999: 47-48). Svolik claims that the outcomes of a consolidated democracy 
include civil society, political competition and interaction between the public and the elites 
(Svolik, 2014:715).  
According to Poast and Urpelainen, a democracy can be only considered consolidated if the 
risk of an authoritarian reversal equals zero (2014: 78). The risk of a democratic breakdown 
almost disappears if a democracy survives for at least two decades (Svolik, 2014: 719). 
During the transition phase, only one in three democracies reach an age where autharitatian 
reversal is no longer a problem (Svolik, 2014: 723). Furthermore, a fully stable democracy 
mostly needs two or three elections to take root and consolidate (Kabir, 1999:157). 
The crucial years are the first five years after the breakdown of the authoritarian regime 
(Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 59). In order to achieve a consolidated democracy a nation 
state has to overcome various obstacles. The main challenges are the effective promotion of 
democracy, and to counteract a possible authoritarian reversal.  
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3. The challenges for young democracies 
3.1 Authoritarian reversal  
Regimes that are situated in their first years of democracy are defined through their political 
instability and the high risk of having a democratic breakdown (Poast and Urpelainen, 2014: 
78). During the transition to a democracy, a nation-state might be more vulnerable to reverse 
to an authoritarian regime, in comparison to the stage where democracy has already been 
consolidated (Svolik, 2008: 719). Young democracies have more political and economic 
volatility (Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 58).  
Throughout the period of 1960 until 2004, 56 nation-states out of 123, did not overcome the 
challenges that are typical in a transition to a democracy, and witnessed authoritarian reversal 
(Converse and Kapstein, 2008, 59). Most of the breakdowns occur either through a civil war 
such as the case of the Republic of the Congo in 1997, through a military coup for example in 
Argentina in 1976 where the president Isabel Peron got overthrown, or after a democratically 
elected actor subverts the democracy. One example could be the suspension of the Peruvian 
congress and constitution by Alberto Fujimori in 1992. 91 percent of democratic breakdowns 
occur through the subversion of a democracy or through a military coup. (Svolik, 2014: 717-
718). 
Most scholars dealing with democratization claim that in order to avoid a democratic 
breakdown, favorable circumstances have to be created. They claim that both economic 
performance and the institutional landscape play a big role in tackling authoritarian reversal 
(Svolik, 2008). 
Researchers “have traditionally cited three factors as being especially detrimental to a young 
democracy’s chances for consolidation: first, unfavorable ‘initial conditions’ in terms of civil 
society, natural resources, levels of inequality, and degrees of ethnic fragmentation; second, 
poor economic performance and ‘shock therapy’ economic reforms such as price 
liberalization and privatization that generate lots of losers and high levels of unemployment; 
and third, strong presidential regimes that draw leaders toward authoritarian rule” (Converse 
and Kapstein, 2008:127). 
After analyzing various case studies, it has been proved that a democracy does not reverse if 
the income per capita tops $4,000. Moreover the chances of a reversal are twice as high in 
countries with a higher-than average economic inequality, than in states with a low inequality 
(Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 131).  
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According to the studies of Converse and Kapstein, countries with a big ethnic fragmentation 
are reversed 49 percent of the time, compared to 36 percent of the time when ethnic 
fragmentation was below average (2008: 132). However, in some countries such as Malawi, 
Mozambique and Ecuador where the initial conditions were not in favor of a consolidation, 
democracies have survived for a long term. Thus, the initial conditions are not deterministic 
for a democratic survival (Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 133)  
Other factors play also an important role in the democratization of a country. Scholars such as 
Lipset, Diamond or Epstein supported the Modernization Theory which claims that economic 
growth is closely related to democracies and it is the main and necessary factor to counteract a 
democratic breakdown (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1999; Epstein, Bates and Goldstone, 2006 
et.al.). 
Milan Svolik studied 193 democratization processes and observed effects of economic and 
institutional covariates on the process. The empirical study demonstrated a positive 
correlation between the economic growth of a country and a democratic survival, as wealth 
lowers the hazard of a reversal (Svolik, 2008: 153). However, the military coup in Thailand 
proved that a robust economic growth is not a necessary condition for the consolidation of a 
democracy (Svolik, 2014:728). Another example that demonstrates that low capita per income 
is not necessarily the only factor for an authoritarian reversal is the democratization of Eastern 
European countries; during their democratization they experienced an economic collapse and 
a Great depression.  
Other factors that are important in counteracting an authoritarian reversal are the institutional 
arrangements in the nation-state. (Svolik, 2014: 723). During the democratization, countries 
have to transform state institutions into effective and democratic entities (Carothers, 2009:81). 
Boix and Adsera as well as many other scholars
1
 argue that in comparison to a parliamentary 
regime, a presidential regime is more likely to jeopardize a democracy (2004: 9). A 
presidential regime, particularly in young democracies, is more prone to reverse authoritarian 
due to following reasons: Given the fact that through this institutional arrangement, only one 
single person is able to take over the executive power, all the other political parties, 
oppositions and minorities are not involved in the decision-making processes and 
policymaking. Thus, popular unrest and ethnic fragmentation are more likely to happen, 
which could cause a democratic breakdown, for example through a civil war. In addition, a 
presidential regime promotes ideological polarization that subsequently might lead to political 
                                                          
1
 See Linz (1994), Cheibub (2002) et al. for a further analysis on institutional arrangements and democratic 
stabilty.  
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tension and unrest. Finally the most important argument that shows the instability of 
presidential democratic regimes is the fact that the single incumbent in power has better 
chances to subvert a democracy. (Boix and Adsera, 2004: 9-10) 
In their studies of 123 democratizations from 1960 until 2004, Converse and Kapstein 
observed that only 40 percent of the democracies which did not have a presidential regime, or 
had strong constraints on the executive, broke down. Compared to that, 70 percent of the 
consolidating young democracies with weak constraints on the executive experienced an 
authoritarian reversal (Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 64). “We therefore stress the importance 
of assessing the actual balance of power in new democracies, whether the regime type is 
parliamentary or presidential.” (Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 64). The case of the 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez who secured to stay in power by seeking to revoke 
presidential term limits, shows the risks of a democratic backsliding through a lack of 
executive constraints (Converse and Kapstein, 2008a: 81).  
In sum, there are various mechanisms that could prevent and authoritarian reversal and 
promote democracy. However, it is not clear which one of the factors is necessary for a 
successful democratization: all factors such as economic growth, the institutional framework, 
or initial conditions, such as ethnic unification, play a certain role in the prevention of an 
authoritarian reversal and therefore a successful consolidation (Converse and Kapstein, 2014; 
Svolik, 2014).  
3.2 Military legacy and democratization 
Scholars such as Barbara Geddes claim that an important factor that has to be considered in 
the process of democratization is the authoritarian legacy. Military regime is an autocratic 
form of governance ruled by a military institution, in which multiple military officers 
influence the decision making in a state (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 152). Military rule 
is defined through the governance of men who are specialized in armed force, the 
maintenance of order and discipline rather than political affairs (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 
2014: 148).  
Most of the military leaders prioritize the survival of the military itself, which can be achieved 
through the maintenance of a hierarchy, the cohesiveness within the military, and the 
autonomy from civilian intervention. In addition, military regimes put a high value on the 
territorial integrity and the internal order of the state (Geddes, 1999: 126). Geddes explains 
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that these forms of authoritarian rule are surprisingly fragile and last less long than other types 
of regimes. (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 156)  
Nearly all the military regimes resulted in democratization. The autocratic regime is prone to 
breakdown if there are internal splits that threaten the unity of the military; In case of internal 
factionalism, most of the officers prefer a return to the barracks. Other factors that lead to a 
breakdown are economic crises, popular protests and external pressure (Geddes, 1999: 131). 
“Military governments are more vulnerable to economic downturns than other 
authoritarianisms because poor economic performance is likely to precipitate or worsen splits 
in the officer corps. On average, military governments can survive only moderate amounts of 
economic bad news.” (Geddes, 1999: 135). 
In case of a coup that is initiated to return power to civilians, military officers often negotiate 
their extrication rather than being violently forced out. (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 
158). During the process of democratization, a young democracy has not only to take into 
account the challenges mentioned in the previous chapter, but also the consequences that the 
military regime has created through its authoritarian rule. Although military regimes are more 
likely to democratize than personalist - , or single-party regimes, young democracies with a 
military past are more likely to experience an authoritarian reversal than democracies with 
other authoritarian legacies: Only one in eight democracies with a past military regime was 
able to fully consolidate. 
In comparison, studies demonstrate that nine of ten young democracies with any other type of 
authoritarian past were able to consolidate (Svolik, 2008: 162). One of the reasons why an 
authoritarian reversal is more possible in post-military regimes is because of the fact that the 
military is more trained and equipped to do a military coup, and subvert the democracy (Poast 
and Urpelainen,2014: 86). Thus, it is important to create incentives that convince and 
encourage the military not to interrupt the democratization (Ikenberry and Pevehouse, 2005: 
145). Officers, for example, that returned to the barracks after the breakdown of the 
authoritarian regime, get often increased salaries and budgets by the transitional government 
that feels threatened of losing its first democratic achievements (Geddes, 1999: 131). As 
military rulers often negotiate their extrication, the transition to a democracy is also 
negotiated according to the military’s interests; therefore it often does not fulfill the criteria of 
a consolidated democracy (Bünte, 2010: 1).  
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As Kabir argues “an important condition for democratic stability is parting away with the 
authoritarian legacy and establishment of new democratic socio-cultural, economic and 
political institutions, norms and practice.” (1999: 169). By studying the democratization of 
Bangladesh, Kabir explained that military rules have a control over the national economy 
(1999:161). The authoritarian regime defends the economic status quo, destroys traditional 
elites and nationalizes parts of the economy (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 150). Under 
the military rule of the Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, for example, who initiated 
capitalist policies, a lot of Chilean business owners failed, and the economy shifted in order to 
please Pinochet’s interests (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 150). 
As Geddes, Frantz and Wright claim, military governments often do not have the ability to 
govern countries with modern economies because of the prioritization of other issues such as 
the unity and force of the military (2014: 151). Thus, democratization is not only under the 
risk of a possible military coup, but it is also very often necessary to establish a modern 
economy in order to create favorable conditions for the democratization. Moreover, military 
regimes are organized around the mission to protect the state from external security threats. 
Therefore there are mostly no externally-oriented organizations that would help to interact 
with the international community in order to boost trade openness, or to ask for support from 
international organizations – factors which are also favorable for democratization (Kabir, 
1999: 16; Poast and Urpelainen, 2014. 80). Protectionist barriers from advanced industrial 
countries are detrimental for the economic growth of a country in particular for the 
agricultural sector (Converse and Kapstein, 2008: 166).  
Another favorable condition for a successful democratization is the institutional arrangement 
in a young democracy. Hadenius and Toerell argue that military regimes most frequently end 
up in limited multiparty regime, before transitioning to a consolidated democracy (2007: 157). 
Limited multiparty regimes hold presidential or parliamentary elections in which opposition 
candidates are also able to participate. The elections take place and there is a certain degree of 
competition between candidates who act as individuals or represent different parties. 
However, the elections are not free and fair as some groups are excluded from the process. 
One example of a limited multiparty system is Mexico’s regime till 2000 (Hadenius nd 
Toerell, 2007: 147).  
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Like in most types of authoritarian regime, civil society is excluded by the military regime. 
Thus, one of the challenges in the consolidation of the democracy is to educate and promote 
civil society, in order to ensure a political participation, as well as to reduce the chances that 
the military regime returns back to power (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014: 151).  
4. External methods to influence democratization 
Since the first democratization waves, researchers like Almond (1949) or Dahl (1961) have 
studied the transition to a democracy and have attempted to explain, how domestic factors 
have affected this process (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 26). Most of the studies on 
democratization focus on the internal factors of a nation-state.  
After the Cold War, and the increasing multipolarity and globalization in the world, the 
debate has been raised, how an external third actor may influence the democratization of a 
state. According to Morlino and Magen, analysis has to remain on a domestic level as the 
process itself develops only within the national system (2009: 29). The authors identify the 
democratization as a “domestic drama” where international factors are truly independent 
variables. Given this assumption, the only way of understanding the impact of external forces 
on democratization, is through the analysis of an internal-external-agency interaction 
(Whitehead, 2002: 40-41; Morlino and Magen, 2009: 29).  
Several authors suggest that democratization is a likely outcome if linkage and leverage are 
high. Linkage explains the intensity of interactions between international actors and the 
democratizing state. The interactions take mostly place on a social and economic level such as 
trade agreements, transnational media or students’ exchange programs (Burnell and 
Schlumberger, 2010: 6; Levitsky and Way, 2005: 19). Leverage is defined as vulnerability of 
an authoritarian state to external democratizing pressure. Leverage can be exerted by 
international actors in various ways, including military intervention, diplomatic-, or economic 
sanctions. (Levitsky and Way, 2005: 20-21)  
There are four methods in which agency and the internal agency interact with each other in 
order to influence a democratization process. Third actors are able to influence the way to a 
democracy through control, conditionality, socialization and by being a democratic example 
2
 
(Morlino and Magen, 2009: 30). Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright categorize the 
                                                          
2
 See also Kubicek  (2003),  Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) et. Al.for methods of external influence. 
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methods of influence into conditionality, economic sanctions, shaming campaigns, and 
military interventions (2015: 17).  
In the case of democratization trough control and coercion,an external military force intervenes in a 
state and ovethrows the autharitatian regime. The military forces use coercive power to reinstall 
democratic institutions and values. (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 30).  
Another method of influence is captured in the notion of democratic example, or 
demonstration. Democratic states serve as an example to inspire democratizing states to 
consolidate their democracy. By observing and emulating democratic institutions, norms and 
policies of democratic states, policy-maker try to improve the political system within their 
own nation-state (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 38; Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010: 5).
3
 
4.1 Socialization  
“International democratic socialization – is defined as a process of inducting individuals and 
states into the democratic norms and rules of a given regional, international or transnational 
community- involves variably intrusive linkages, with the socialization potential and practices 
of different international actors ranging on a continuum of intensity” (Morlino and Magen, 
2009: 34). 
Through the establishment of relations between states and international organizations, 
democratization can be facilitated as states adopt certain norms and rules that are conditional 
for a successful consolidation. (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 34; Burnell and Schlumberger, 
2010: 6-7). Compared to the other forms of external influence, socialization can be defined as 
normative pressure: Third actors are norm entrepreneurs which influence the targeted 
decision-makers to follow the logic of appropriateness, and to act according to democratic 
practices (Magen, Risse-Kappen and McFaul, 2009: 36; Finnemore and Sikkink; 1998; 895).  
Various authors have further examined that one of the best ways of socialization is through 
membership in networks, such as international institutions, or organizations (Slaughter, 
2004:144). Examples are the World Bank, the International Labour Organization, or different 
UN organizations (Magen and Morlino, 2009: 36). Poast and Urpeleinen claim that a 
membership in international organizations influence democratizing states to consolidate, as a 
membership augments the legitimacy of political institutions on an international level. Thus 
                                                          
3
 These two methods will be not analyzed more in depth as they are not contributing to answer the research 
question. 
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the governments are less able to jeopardize democratic practices which might lead to an 
authoritarian reversal (2014: 84).  
4.2 Conditionality 
One of the most common methods of facilitating the democratization process from outside is 
by establishing conditions that promote democracy, or that prevent an authoritarian reversal. 
Scholars distinguish between negative and positive conditions (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 31; 
Magen, Risse-Kappen and McFaul: 2009: 13; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2015: 18) 
Negative conditions are non-coercive, non-military, political, diplomatic or economic 
sanctions which are used to induce policy changes (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 31). External 
agents such as the European Union use sanctions to motivate a democratic transition within 
the respective state. Economic sanctions, for example, diminish resources that could be useful 
for an authoritarian regime to stay in power, or to regain the autocracy after a democratic 
transition (Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2015: 24; Morlino and Magen, 2009: 31). Alternatively, 
positive conditions intend to stimulate democratic practice. Positive conditionality comes in 
form of “trade-and aid benefits with acceptance of democracy and human rights clauses in 
contractual agreements, and sanctioning existing member states for conduct deviating from 
collective norms” (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 32). States that adapt to democratic 
international standards receive various international entitlements. Through positive 
conditionality, international actors make initial conditions for a democratic consolidation 
more favorable, such as the empowerment of civil society- and minorities, or by bolstering the 
opposition (Morlino and Magen, 2009: 32; Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2015: 24, Burnell, 
2005: 371).  Examples for forms conditionality are the human rights-, and democracy clauses 
that the European Union imposes in free trade agreements with third countries. The European 
Union predisposes conditions that are favorable for a democratic consolidation (Burnell, 
2005: 371).  
4.3 The European Union as an external agent in the process of democratization 
The European Union is one of the main western institutions which attempts to influence 
democratization processes on an international field (Kotthaus, 2015: 46). 
The EU is described as a normative soft power in the international system that avoids using 
coercive methods to implement its values and principles (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 
2011: 888).  Its main principles are democracy, rule of law and human rights. (Burnell, 2005: 
366).  
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According to Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty “The Union's action on the international scene 
shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, 
the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law” (Article 21, TEU). In addition, being 
surrounded by democracies can ensure more stability and peace, as the states are less prone to 
attack each other. (Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 2011: 996).  
4.3.1 Instruments of the EU-democracy promotion 
The instruments that are used by the European Union can be categorized in acts that create 
opportunities for a democratic development, or that constrain actors who endanger the 
democratization process. There are two main forms of EU-instruments: hierarchical-, and 
networks- governance. The hierarchical governance is a relationship based on subordination 
and domination. In this case, the European Union imposes rules on a non-member state 
through conditionality (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009: 796).  
Another instrument is the network constellation, in which the involved agents interact on an 
equal level, and no party can bind the other one without mutual consent. This instrument is 
based on interaction, political dialogue and cooperation. Consequently a democratizing state 
enters in the process of socialization. One of the examples is the Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly of African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP), with the Members of the European 
parliament whose aim is to promote the interdependence between North and South, and to 
integrate key values of a democracy (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009: 791-798, Börzel 
and Risse, 2004). 
4.4 External influence on the democratization of post-military regimes 
Burnell and Schlumberger who examined the promotion of democracy, have emphasized the 
importance of the context, in which the democratization process takes place. According to the 
scholars, the conditions and the process of how a post-communist regime democratizes, is 
very different to the manner a military regime democratizes (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010: 
8). Thus, the external agents have to take into consideration the different circumstances, and 
implement their policies accordingly. (Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010: 7).  
As mentioned above, the democratization of a post-military regime is difficult as the military 
is equipped well enough to regain power through a coup. Therefore, external assistance 
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should tackle the elements which might lead to an authoritarian reversal (Poast and 
Urpelainen, 2014: 109).  
In order to avoid a democratic breakdown in a state with a military legacy, external agents 
have to encourage and create incentives for the “loosers” and “winners” of the process. In this 
case actors such as the European Union should ensure that the military which has negotiated 
its extrication, or has returned voluntarily to the barracks, has enough incentives and 
stimulations to stay in the background. Whereas, civil society and the democratic regime have 
to be motivated to contribute to the democratic development of the country (Pevehouse and 
Ikenberry, 2005: 145; 176).  
5. Methodology 
As there is still no theory which explains the instruments that third actors use to prevent an 
authoritarian reversal in post-military regimes, this thesis aims to build a theory that seeks to 
fill this literature gap.  
In order to establish a new theoretical framework, the author will analyze the case of the 
democratization in Myanmar and the way the EU has contributed to the prevention of its 
authoritarian reversal.  
Besides the main research question
4
, the case analysis seeks to understand following question:  
What are the main risks for an authoritarian reversal in Myanmar and how does the EU 
contribute to prevent its democratic breakdown? 
5.1 Methods used 
The paper will be using Process Tracing. Process Tracing “is an analytical tool for drawing 
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence- often understood as part 
of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (Collier, 2011: 824). This qualitative method 
explains causal and temporal mechanisms, which means it helps to understand why one 
variable, or more, have led to a certain outcome. This method will facilitate to identify the key 
actors, and factors that interfered in the democratization process (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 
6).  
According to Moses and Kutsen, case studies are one of the most frequently used research 
designs. By applying this approach, this research will elaborate the theoretical concepts, 
which will be later used on the case of Myanmar (2007: 113).  
                                                          
4
 see introduction (page 3) 
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5.2 A framework for analysis 
The analysis will be structured as follows: In order to answer the research questions, the EU-
policies towards Myanmar will be analyzed. It will be researched whether the external agent 
has tackled the risks that lead to an authoritarian reversal in a post-military regime. 
Based on the theoretical framework, which explains how various conditions influence a 
successful consolidation of democracy, the analysis will particularly focus on: 
1) The effectiveness of EU policies to create favorable initial conditions in Myanmar. 
2) The effectiveness of EU policies in fostering Myanmar’s economic development. 
3) The effectiveness of EU policies to establish a favorable institutional arrangement in 
Myanmar.  
 
6. Analysis 
For a better understanding of the political and economic situation of the case, there will be a 
short introduction of the history of Myanmar from 1948 until 2010. Subsequently, it will be 
explained how the situation has changed after the first democratic elections in 2010. 
6.1 Historical Background of Myanmar 
Myanmar’s geopolitical and strategic position between China and India, and its richness of 
natural resources, has been interesting for various countries around the world: From 1885 
until 1942, Myanmar was a British colony. The colonial rule created first divisions among the 
Burmese society: By employing ethnic minorities in specific sectors of the economy, the 
British created resentment between various communities and deepened racial differences. The 
division of the population had an impact on today’s Burmese society as there is still a lot 
repression of minorities in the country (Steinberg, 2010:15-29).  
With the help of Japanese forces, the “Anti-fascist people’s freedom party” led by Aung San, 
was able to liberate the country from the British rule in 1942. After 5 years of Japanese 
occupation, Burma finally gained independence in 1948, and became a democracy (Taylor, 
1982: 176). During the democratic years, the ethnic fragmentation increased, as well as 
intercommunal violence. Furthermore the price of rice fell – the main income source of the 
country’s population- which created economic instability in Myanmar (Mahadevan, 2013: 
59).  
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The instability created the perfect opportunity for the military to take over the power.  
Thus in 1962, the Burmese army “Tatmadaw” initiated a coup d’état under the pretest that the 
country would not function under a parliamentary system (Williams, 2011: 1200).   
Under the military rule of General Ne Win, a new form of socialism has been created, called 
the “Burmese Way of Socialism”. All aspects of society were nationalized and centralized 
(Mahadevan, 2013: 599). The regime established protectionist barriers from the rest of the 
world, and the economy became nationalized. The military had the full control over the 
country’s economy. Foreign investors and businessmen had to leave the country, and by 1987, 
Burma was classified as “Least developed Country” by the UN (Turnell, 2011: 83). 
The military did not only control the economy, as well as the civil society
5
 and the opposition: 
Student-led protests, as well as other political parties were suppressed throughout the years of 
the regime. Only in 1988, students, religious groups, and civil society organizations started to 
protest nationwide. During these protests, Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, held her 
first speech and encouraged the Burmese population to continue fighting peacefully for a 
democracy. Due to the protests, the military junta arranged free elections in 1990. The 
National League for Democracy (NLD)- led by Aung San Suu Kyi- won 398 out of 447 seats 
in the parliament. (Oxord Burma Alliance, 2016) 
However, the military whose official name was now the “State Peace and Development 
Council” (SPDC), or also known as the “State Law and Order Restoration Council” 
(SLORC), annulled the results and did not hand over the power to the NLD.  
From 1990 the junta established a new approach to rule the country: by increasing the number 
of soldiers, the regime aimed to prevent new mass protests. Furthermore, they suppressed any 
form of protest and condemned Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest for 15 years.  
In regards to the economy, the military rule attempted to open the country to foreign 
investment and trade. However, the regime was not trained in economic planning, and after an 
initial economic growth, the state suffered again from declining investment, and high 
inflation. 
From 1992 until 2010, General Than Shwe represented the military rule. Under his hand, the 
constitution of Myanmar has been changed: The constitution enabled civilians to participate 
to a certain degree in politics - under the condition that 25 percent of the seats in the 
parliament would be reserved for the military. In order to prevent Aung San Suu Kyi to gain 
an important role in politics, citizens married to foreigners, or who had been convicted, would 
                                                          
5
 Civil society can be defined as a group of actors which is separate from market and state. It includes organized 
groups, such as protest-camps or campaign supporters, trade unions, students’ movements, religious groups, and 
NGO’s. Political parties, armed groups and the business sector are excluded from the definition (Lall, 2016: 6-7) 
 18 
 
not have the rights to become President. (Williams, 2011: 1208, Skidmore and Wilson, 
2008:16) 
The decision of changing the constitution in favor of civil participation has been caused by the 
so-called “Saffron Revolution” in 2007, in which thousands of monks protested on the streets 
of the capital Rangoon. Several people, were killed and arrested during that revolution, and as 
a consequence international actors such as the United States or the EU tightened their 
sanctions, and called for action (Oxford Burma Alliance, 2016).  
Finally after national-, and international pressure, and continuing popular protests, the 
military regime announced to hold elections by 2010, and promised a democratic transition 
for the country (Williams, 2011: 1119-1201; Oxfordburmaalliance.org, 2016, Turnell, 2011: 
80-82).  
Another reason for voluntarily leaving the power to a civilian government was a humanitarian 
crisis which was caused by a Cyclone. According to International Organizations, the 
consequences of this natural disaster led to circa 140.000 deaths and to 2.5 million people in 
need of assistance. The military regime did not have the capacity to reconstruct the country, 
and had to ask the international community for support (Oxford Burma Alliance, 2016). 
6.1.1 Myanmar’s first steps towards a democracy.  
The general elections on 7 November 2010 were the first step towards the democratization of 
Myanmar.  
However, the military junta had still a lot of control over the preparation of the elections, as 
well as on the vote tally. The military regime banned international organizations to observe 
the elections, and foreign media were not allowed to cover the election-process. In about 3000 
villages, the Commission cancelled the voting, claiming that the regions were too conflicted 
to conduct democratic election procedures. Furthermore, the military regime implemented 
new laws that would not allow anyone who was imprisoned, to join a political party. This 
constrained Aung San Suu Kyi, the favorite candidate of the population, to race in the 
elections with the NLD. Consequently, the NLD dissolved and did not take part in the 2010-
elections. (Oxford Burma Alliance, 2016)  
In the end, the “Union Solidarity and Development Party” won, and U Thein Sein became the 
president of the new government. During the whole electoral campaign, the military junta 
supported USDP, particularly with funding. In addition, the constitution which allowed the 
military to have seats in the Parliament did not change, and the junta continued to be present 
in Myanmar’s politics. Although the USDP was in favor of the military, U Thein Sein 
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initiated political and economic reforms, which promoted the democratization of the country. 
His aim was a national reconciliation with the NLD, to empower civil society, and to reform 
the economy (Lall, 2016: 165).   
6.1.2 EU-Myanmar Relations  
Until the elections in 2010, the EU had strict sanction-policies towards Myanmar and its 
regime. After the annulation of the elections in 1990, the European Union decided to 
implement sanctions that attempted to force the military out of power (Giumelli and Ivan, 
2013: 28). The sanctions included an arms-embargo, the stop of non-humanitarian aid, a 
travel ban which by 2010 enclosed 1854 individuals, and finally a trade embargo with goods 
that would be beneficial for the regime. (Giumelli and Ivan, 2013:27).  
The reforms which have been implemented by U Thein Sein, have also had an impact on the 
relationship between the European Union and Myanmar: From 2012 the European Union 
gradually lifted and suspended the sanctions towards Myanmar, with the exception of the 
arms embargo (EEAS, 2016). The European Union committed itself to support the 
democratization of Myanmar with different tools that will be analyzed in the following 
chapters.
6
 
6.2 Favorable initial conditions to prevent the risk of an authoritarian reversal  
In January 2011, President U Thein Sein officially declared to initiate a reform process that 
would lead to more inclusive and participatory decision-making. The reform processes 
included the abolition of the censorship of media in order to grant access to information, and 
propaganda slogans disappeared from all the newspapers (Lall, 2016: 74).  
From 2011 until 2014, political activists and opponents of the military junta were released 
from their sentences (Lall, 2016: 74-75). Moreover, “bills on local democracy, labor unions, 
micro-finance, environmental conservation and the registration of private schools were 
submitted” (Lall, 2016: 74). 
One of the main tools which were used by the authoritarian regime to oppress the civil society 
was education. Although the SLORC implemented a reform in 2002 which granted everyone 
an access to education, the curricula were based on propagating the military regime. 
Furthermore the economic situation did not allow families, particularly in rural areas, to send 
                                                          
6
 Due to the space limit, the author has chosen to analyze only the most relevant EU-policies towards Myanmar 
that aim to address the research question. For further information of the EU-Myanmar relations, see: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/index_en.htm 
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their children to schools. In 2011, Thein Sein set out new guiding lines for education, called 
“Education for all” which aimed to implement a free, compulsory primary education system, 
to upgrade the educational standard to an international level, and to promote laws for the 
participation and contribution of private sector in the education service (Lall, 2016: 166). 
Besides the empowerment of civil society, another favorable condition to successfully 
consolidate a democracy is the integration of ethnic minorities in a society. Various ethnicities 
are represented in different parts of the state, and intercommunal violence is one of the main 
concerns in the country. Frequent intercommunal conflicts are situated in the Rakhine State 
where the Rohingya community lives. The Muslim minority has been marginalized from any 
form of social or political life since colonization. The government does not recognize their 
citizenship claiming that the community has origins in Bangladesh.  
Since the military regime, state-authorities have strategically excluded, killed, or forced the 
community, to leave the country. Even after the liberalization of the country, authorities have 
not supported the integration of the minority. In 2012, riots between Muslims and Buddhist 
led to 200 deaths in particular from the Rohingya community. Most of the police men who 
were supposed to control the clashes were against the Muslim minority, and it was reported 
that they did not stop attacks (International Crisis Group, 2015a: 7-8).  The segregation of the 
Rohingya community shows that the Burmese government has not fulfilled one of the 
conditions for a successful democratic consolidation – ethnic unification. 7 
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, favorable initial conditions are important to 
prevent an authoritarian reversal. If the civil society is not empowered enough, and the ethnic 
fragmentation is present in Myanmar’s political landscape, the risk of an authoritarian reversal 
is still high and thus successful consolidation of democracy is endangered.  
In order to effectively contribute to a successful consolidation of a democracy where the risk 
of an authoritarian reversal equals zero, an external agent has to address issues such as the 
empowerment of civil society (“the loosers” of the military regime), and the ethnic 
fractionalization.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 Due to the space limit, the author will only analyze educational reforms and the empowerment of the Rohingya 
community as initial favorable conditions.  
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6.2.1 The contribution of the EU to establish favorable initial conditions 
During 2011 until 2013, the European Union invested circa 40 percent out of 33 million euros 
into educational projects in Myanmar. Funds for the educational sector have been invested 
into the “Multi-Donor Education Fund” (MDEF) - a fund initiated by the international 
organization UNICEF which improves access to basic education. 
The MDEF was aligned with the government’s reform “Education for all”. Therefore the 
negotiations went through the government (EEAS, 2011: 8-9). As the national government 
was still excluding the Rohingya community, the EU initiated more cooperation with local 
civil society organizations that would not be aligned with the military-friendly government 
(EEAS, 2011: 9). One project that has been launched in 2012 is the “Children for Peace” 
initiative. Through the cooperation with local communities in conflict-affected areas such as 
the Rakhine state, the EU attempted to facilitate access to education. Therefore education 
would be also granted in areas that were not supported by the state authorities (EEAS, 2014: 
7).  
From 2014 on, the EU initiated a new program to support the democratization process, 
whereas 35 percent of the budget would be invested in the educational sector. The main goals 
were an increase in the quality of teaching, enhanced management of the school system, and 
the reduction of cost barriers (EEAS, 2014: 13-15).The reforms would be still aligned with 
the national government, and with international organizations such as UNICEF (EEAS, 2014: 
14).  
Besides that, the European Union started to promote civil society organizations without the 
national government’s consent. The objective was to strengthen local communities and to 
diminish the oppression of the civil society caused by the military legacy. The annual 
“European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) grant is circa 1,8 million 
dollars, and supports especially organizations that support minorities’ rights, such as the 
Rohingya community (European Commission, 2009). In order to get the grant, the 
organizations have to apply and fulfill the condition to be a legal person who is not related to 
the government.  
Another initiative for a successful democratization was the Human Rights Dialogue which 
was initiated in May 2014. In order to enhance cooperation, and deepen mutual understanding 
between the government of Myanmar and the EU, various issues were discussed that would 
strengthen international human rights standards. Through a political dialogue, the European 
Union helped the government, to learn best practices in “ratifying international conventions 
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and treaties, to identify challenges and to strengthen their links in cooperation in areas of 
mutual interest.” (EEAS, 2014a) 
6.2.2 The effectiveness of the EU- policies to create favorable initial conditions 
In regards to favorable conditions, the European Union has addressed the main “looser” of the 
military regime: the civil society. During the authoritarian regime, the military has oppressed 
the population particularly through education. By channeling the aid through the “MDEF” 
fund which supported the government’s plan “Education for all”, the EU has included 
Myanmar in the international community - by creating a network between UNICEF, the EU 
and the national government. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, a network 
constellation would help a country to enter into the process of socialization and adapt to 
democratic principles. 
However, the EU has not effectively helped to overcome the authoritarian legacy, and support 
the vulnerable members of society, as it has channeled most of its funds through Myanmar’s 
government. In particular during the years of 2011 and 2015, the USPD has been still 
supported by the military, and Thein Sein was in favor of the reserved parliamentary seats for 
military officials. By supporting the government, the European Union did not create 
incentives to negotiate the extrication of the remaining military personnel.  
Concerning the ethnic minorities, the European Union has created funds for civil society 
organizations. However, one of the conditions of getting the EIDHR-grant is to be a legal 
person. These conditions cannot be fulfilled by members of the Rohingya community as most 
of them do not have a citizenship status in Myanmar. The cooperation and dialogue with the 
government about Human Rights can make Myanmar’s government better adapt to 
democratic norms and values. However, by mainly interacting with this agent, the ethnic 
fragmentation in the country cannot be solved, as the government does not support the public 
participation of the Muslim minority.  
In sum, the EU has not contributed enough to establish favorable conditions that might lower 
the risk for an authoritarian reversal: the external actor has neglected the fact that the 
government is still influenced by the military. Instead of considering the presence of the 
military in Myanmar’s political landscape, the EU has strengthened it, by helping to adapt 
more to the international community. 
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6.3 Economic development in Myanmar after 2011 
The decades of military rule have affected the economic situation in the country. The 
protectionist barriers and the isolation of Myanmar from the rest of the world have led to an 
income per capita of 1000 US dollars which increased the high risk of authoritarian reversal
8
 
(Lall, 2016: 133). The lack of transparency during the military rule has increased corruption. 
As the military only cooperated with some elected entrepreneurs, a business class had been 
created which consequently led to an oligarchic unproductive economic structure (Lall, 2016: 
134-135).  
One of the main priorities for the new government was to reform the economy. The aim was 
to be more transparent, reduce corruption, reengage with the international community, 
industrialize, and decentralize the economy. Thein Sein initiated different reforms such as the 
“Special Economic Zones” (SEZ) which would create better conditions for foreign investors. 
“The incentives for foreign investors include up to 75 years’ land use rights for large-scale 
industry, low income tax rates, consumption of import duties for raw materials, machineries 
and equipment, and relaxed foreign shareholding” (Lall, 2016: 141). Within the “Framework 
for Economic and Social Development”, the USDP initiated reforms concerning different 
topics such as finance and taxation, monetary policy, regulations on trade and investment, 
agriculture, communication services, and infrastructure (Lall, 2016: 146).  
6.3.1 The role of the EU in Myanmar’s economic development 
After the liberalization in 2011, the European Union started to engage in trade with Myanmar. 
The main EU imports from Myanmar are clothing and agricultural products. The main EU 
exports to Myanmar are machinery and transport (European Commission, 2015).  
In 2013, the European Union gave Myanmar access to the so-called the “Generalised Scheme 
of Preferences (GSP)”. This agreement allows developing countries to pay less or no duties on 
exporting to the EU. Thus the access to the EU markets is granted and economic growth can 
be facilitated. For the least developed countries, such as Myanmar, the EU arranged the 
agreement “Everything but Arms” which gives all the countries full duty-free and quota-free 
access to the exports to the EU, except arms and armaments. One of the main goals was to 
reintegrate the country into the international trade system.  
 
                                                          
8
 see page 6  
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Given the isolation from the global economy, the economic development in Myanmar was 
very scarce. The reintegration helped to boost trade: In 2011, EU imports from Myanmar 
were 150 Million Euros. Within 4 years the amount increased rapidly and the imports were in 
total 750 million Euros. The same was in the EU exports; in 2011, exported goods were in 
total 180 million, and in 2015 circa 550 million Euros. Besides the GSP, the EU did not 
commit to any other bilateral trade-agreements with Myanmar (European Commission, 2011; 
European Commission, 2015) 
The EU promoted foreign direct investment: In 2014, Myanmar’s government and the EU 
launched negotiations about investment agreements between the two parties. The agreement 
shall ensure that foreign investors are threatened equally and under fair procedures in the 
country (European Commission, 2015). Thus, foreign actors were more attracted to invest in 
the country’s economy.  
6.3.2 The contribution of EU-policies in Myanmar’s economic development  
The main task to promote economic development was to disrupt the “oligarchic” economic 
structure that the military had created, and furthermore attract foreign investors, as well as 
engage with the global community. From 2011 until 2015, the GDP per capita increased to 
1200 US Dollar, which shows the commitment of the country to foster its economic growth. 
By establishing the GSP, the European Union gave a full access to interact with the global 
economy (World Bank, 2015).  
Considering the fact that former military regimes are highly more under the risk of breaking 
down, the EU could have taken the economic situation of the Myanmar as an opportunity to 
create more incentives for the military to fully retire to the barracks and therefore lower the 
risk of an authoritarian reversal: As Myanmar’s economic development is dependent on trade, 
and investments with the global community, the EU could have created conditions which 
would have let the military to extricate, and leave their seats in the parliament. Furthermore, 
the military has still vast holding companies, such as MEC and UMEH
9
 which are 
monopolizing many markets. Foreign investments had to be through joint ventures with them 
(Lall, 2016: 151). Thus, the military has not been weakened and the European Union has not 
effectively tackled the risks that could reverse the young “democracy”.  
 
.  
                                                          
9
 MEC: Myanmar Economic Corporation 
UMEH: Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings  
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6.4 Myanmar’s institutional arrangements after 2011 
Myanmar is an “authoritarian parliamentary system”. The bicameral parliament is made out of 
an Upper House and a Lower house. For the election of the president, three committees 
formed from upper and lower house parliamentarians nominate three candidates for a 
presidency. Afterwards, the members of the three committees vote for one candidate.  
However, since 2008 until 2015 the constitution has not changed in favor of a fully civilian 
democratic system: The constitution obliges that 25 percent of the seats in the parliament, 
shall be reserved for military officials. In addition, certain top ministry positions, such as the 
ministry of defense, border affairs, home affairs, as well as the president have to have a 
former experience in the military (International Crisis Group, 2015a: 11-13). According to 
Article 436 of the constitution, an amendment has to be ratified by 75 percent of the 
representatives in the parliament. Thus, the military has a veto power in the parliament. 
Civilian parties will never be able reach the majority, given the presence of the military in the 
representatives’ houses (International Crisis Group, 2015: 6-8).  
All these conditions cannot be identified as key drivers for a successful consolidation of 
democracy. Nevertheless, the parliament agreed to change a party registration law in 2012: 
This amendment allowed the NLD to join the parliament and subsequently the party of Aung 
San Suu Kyi won 43 out of 48 seats in the by-elections of 2012. The constitutional 
amendment led also to a victory of the NLD in the general elections of November 2015. Aung 
San Suu Kyi’s party won 80 percent of the parliamentary seats. However, the military still has 
the right to have 25 percent of the seats, and with the five percent of the military- friendly 
USDP, 30 percent of the parliamentary seats are reserved for the authoritarian powers.  
Thus, the NLD has only 60 percent of the seats left: This percentage is still not enough to 
change the constitution in favor of a fully civilian government. (International Crisis Group, 
2015a: 5) 
6.4.1 The role of the EU in Myanmar’s institutional framework 
The main challenge of the institutional arrangement in Myanmar is the constitution of 2008, 
which still gives the military personnel, the opportunity to be in power. Although Myanmar 
transitioned from a military regime to a parliamentary system, the risk of an authoritarian 
reversal is still very high. As an external agent, the European Union cannot directly contribute 
to amendments of the constitution. However, it has initiated various attempts to influence the 
institutional framework: From 2011 until now, the supranational organization tried to make 
the public administration more efficient and decentralized. Through workshops, trainings and 
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dialogues, the EU attempted to teach, how to improve policy-making of the government. The 
workshops and trainings were more directed towards local authorities.  
From 2011 until 2015, fourteen percent of the development budget of the EU towards 
Myanmar went into strengthening good governance and the policy dialogue with respective 
authorities. (EEAS, 2014: 13-14). Nevertheless the only way to achieve a fully democratic 
institutional landscape is to change the constitution and negotiate the extrication of the 
military from the parliament. However, the European Union does not have the capability to 
have an effective impact on the institutional arrangements of Myanmar’s “disciplined 
democracy”. 
6.4.2 The contribution of the EU to improve Myanmar’s institutional landscape 
As mentioned in the theoretical part of this thesis, the external agent can only influence the 
“domestic drama” to a certain degree, and mainly through interaction. Thus, it was very 
difficult for the European Union to shape the institutional framework of Myanmar. As 
previously discussed, the EU has not implemented policies towards the country that would be 
incentives for the military, to fully extricate, and negotiate the constitutional amendments.   
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7. Findings and Recommendations 
In conclusion, this essay has sought to bring forward the debate upon the democratization of 
military regimes and the manner external agents contribute to prevent authoritarian reversal.  
In order to bridge these issues, this thesis aimed to answer the question whether the European 
Union’s policies have contributed to prevent the risks of authoritarian reversal in post-military 
regimes. The case study of Myanmar has sought to answer the research question.  
Building upon the works of Milan Svolik, Barbara Geddes, Kapstein and Converse, the 
process of democratization was first discussed. The democratization process goes through 
three different stages: the breakdown of an authoritarian regime, the transition, and the 
consolidation of a democracy. After the transition to a democracy, countries have to prevent 
an authoritarian reversal and further consolidate the democracy. The main factors that lead to 
a successful outcome of the process are economic growth, a solid institutional framework, and 
favorable initial conditions such as ethnic unification, and empowerment of civil society. 
Another important factor is the context in which a country is democratizing: Countries such as 
Myanmar that were ruled by a military regime have to consider the consequences of a military 
legacy and how this can affect the democratization process.  
Former military regimes are more prone to break down as the military is well equipped to 
depose the democratic government. Moreover, the favorable mechanisms for a successful 
democratization such as the economy of a country have been strongly affected by the way the 
authoritarian regime has ruled.  
All these challenges have to be considered by external agents who have an interest in 
influencing the democratization of a country. External actors, for example the European 
Union, who attempt to influence a democratization process, use various instruments to 
support a country in their transition. The external agent can help to make the democratizing 
country adapt to democratic norms, or it can impose conditions which promote democratic 
principles in the respective country. Particularly in post-military regimes, external agents play 
an important role as they can help to create incentives for the military to leave the power to a 
civilian government.  
In order to understand whether the involved agents take into consideration the authoritarian 
legacy of a country, the thesis analyzed the democratization process of Myanmar, and the 
European Union’s contribution to it. Therefore the author analyzed the economic 
developments, the institutional arrangements, the civil society, and the ethnic fragmentation 
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of Myanmar, after its liberalization in 2010. Subsequently it has been analyzed, whether the 
EU has effectively tackled the risks of an authoritarian reversal.   
As the military regime in Myanmar has contributed to unfavorable initial conditions of a 
successful democratization- which means the oppression of the civil society and a high ethnic 
fractionalization, the new democratically elected government initiated reforms in order to 
tackle these issues. A big focus lied on educational programs and the empowerment of civil 
society. Also the European Union supported these reforms, by establishing political dialogues, 
and by cooperating with international organizations such as UNICEF. Therefore it integrated 
Myanmar better into the international community in order to help the country to adapt to 
democratic values. However, it has been noted that the EU did not really consider the military 
legacy in their policies: the organization mainly cooperated with the national government, 
which was still closely aligned to the military junta, as 25 percent of the seats were still 
reserved for military officials.  
The same issues have been analyzed in the contribution of the EU to Myanmar’s economic-, 
and institutional reforms: Concerning the economy, the EU supported holding companies that 
were owned by the military. In addition, it did not establish conditions that would put more 
pressure on the military to fully extricate from the government. 
A favorable institutional framework for a successful consolidation should be preferably 
parliamentary. In the case of Myanmar, after the first democratic elections, the regime was 
still not completely democratic and defined as “authoritarian-parliamentarian”: The military 
junta still had a veto power in the parliament. As an external agent the European Union could 
not influence the domestic affairs, as the extrication of the military would require a 
constitutional amendment. However, military is willing to leave to the barracks if it gets 
offered better conditions than staying in power. Although the European Union would have 
had the capacities to create better incentives, it did not consider this aspect and preferred 
instead to cooperate with the military-friendly government in Myanmar.  
Throughout the analysis it has been shown that all its policies have not specifically tackled the 
challenges which have been caused by Myanmar’s military legacy. Thus, the EU has not 
prevented to lower the risk of a democratic breakdown. One way to convince the military to 
voluntarily leave back to the barracks would be to weaken the unity of the military. As 
mentioned in the theoretical part internal fractionalization of the military can lead to an 
authoritarian breakdown. Regarding the economic development, the EU should stop 
cooperating with military-owned companies and support in new businesses, initiate 
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entrepreneurship programs that would be a chance for Myanmar’s economy to grow and 
simultaneously support civilians to contribute to the countries’ welfare. The conditions for 
grants such as the EIDHR should be changed in order to allow the Rohingya community to 
get an access to the external agent’s help.  
Scholars such as Burnell, Geddes, or Poast and Urpelainen, claim, that the context in which a 
country democratizes is highly relevant for a consolidation of the democracy. Finally, to 
effectively contribute to a prevention of an authoritarian reversal in a post-military regime, the 
EU should focus more on the weaknesses of the military itself, and create better incentives to 
leave a democratizing government fully in civilian hands.  
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